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The resolution of problems with lease renewals in Fiji, particularly
in the sugarcane districts, has ramifications for private investment
and growth in the entire economy. The impending withdrawal of
subsidies to sugar as world trade is liberalised has increased the
urgency of finding solutions to these problems. This paper draws
on game theory to characterise the problems facing the Fiji sugar
industry. The incentives for land and ethnic politics are identified.
Separate proposals are put forward to facilitate secure access to
land and to minimise adjustment costs from the erosion of
preferences under the Sugar Protocol. The rationalisation forced
upon the sugar industry, if managed well, could induce land
reforms that could improve the investment climate and the
prospects for growth, whilst minimising pains of adjustment.
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Facilitating adjustment to the
sugar woes in Fiji
Satish Chand
The stresses facing the Fiji sugar industry
from the expiry of land leases for many
smallholder farmers and the erosion of trade
preferences in the European Union have been
raised by several commentators (see Reddy
and Yanagida 1998; Levantis, Jotzo and
Tulpule 2003; Prasad and Narayan 2004).
Tenants knew some thirty years in advance
of the exact date when their leases were going
to expire, but were shocked when eviction
notices did eventuate. The withdrawal of
subsidies to sugar from the European Union
was imminent since 1986 when agriculture
was first brought within the ambit of GATT
and particularly since December 1994
following the commitment by the European
Union to limit the value of export subsidies
(and the volume of subsidised sugar exports
from the European Union) at the conclusion
of the Uruguay Round.
Preferential access for Fiji sugar into the
United Kingdom and subsequently into the
European Union (after the United Kingdom
joined the European Economic Community
in 1974) has existed since the inception of
the industry in 1879. Some 60,000 workers,
brought from India under the indenture
scheme that lasted until 1916, subsequently
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formed the smallholder sector growing
sugarcane on land leased from the
indigenous population. Preferential access
into the European Union is provided for
under the Sugar Protocol that took effect on
28 February 1975. The Protocol states that
…the [European] Community under-
takes for an indefinite period to
purchase and import, at guaranteed
prices, specific quantities of cane sugar,
raw or white, which originate in the
ACP states and which these States
undertake to deliver to it (Article 1 of
the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol).
According to the Protocol, prices are to be
negotiated annually, though in practice the
price paid to the ACP (African, Caribbean,
and Pacific) states is equal to that paid to EU
producers. In its 1995 review of the sugar
policy, the European Union clearly stated its
intention to comply with its Uruguay Round
commitments of ‘substantial progressive
reductions in agricultural support and
protection’.1 The impetus for withdrawal of
EU sugar subsidies may have been hastened
by disputes registered by Australia, Brazil
and Thailand with the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 2 The Cotonou
Agreement lapses at the end of 2007, at
which time the EU subsidies in the form of
preferential prices for sugar imports will fall
further.
Tenants were shocked by the non-
renewal of their leases because of
expectations that leases would be renewed.
Political leadership was responsible for
creating these expectations. For their part,
landowners have had unrealistically high
expectations of the profitability of sugarcane
farming, and thus have been lured into sugar
cane farming following the eviction of
tenants. Communal politics, in the presence
of rents in the form of sugar-subsidies, have
encouraged inter-ethnic, rent-dissipating
competition. Electoral support in an
ethnically segmented population has been
maximised through the creation of discontent
over the sharing of sugar proceeds between
the growers (the majority of whom are ethnic
Indians) and landowners (the majority of
whom are indigenous). The availability of
rents and opaque property rights provide
fertile grounds for socially unproductive
rent-seeking activity (see Bhagwati 1982 on
directly unproductive profit-seeking
activities). The loss of preferences for sugar
(and greater transparency in decision-
making), therefore, will reduce rent seeking.
This paper draws on a simple game-
theoretic framework to analyse the problems
faced by Fiji’s smallholder sugarcane-
growing sector. The model’s predictions are
consistent with the facts, thus allowing
policy recommendations to be drawn for
facilitating access to land and easing
adjustment to declining preferences. The
challenges of facilitating secure access to
land should be considered separately from
the challenges of facilitating adjustment to
the withdrawal of subsidies to Fijian sugar.
To achieve the former, the Native Land Trust
Board (NLTB) should be ‘unbundled’ into
two separate components: a regulator of the
market for secure access to land and a
competitive component responsible for land-
intermediation. Adjustments to the
withdrawal of sugar subsidies could be
facilitated by ‘decoupling’ the subsidy
implicit in locally produced sugar and using
this as redundancy payments to farmers (and
mill-workers) choosing to opt out of the
industry. An illustrative example is used to
show that such a process could increase the
incomes of the farmers whilst reducing
inefficiencies within the industry.
A synopsis of the sugar sector
Sugar is a large sector of the Fiji economy,
contributing some 7 per cent of GDP, 22 per
cent of total exports, and providing the
livelihoods of nearly a quarter of the total
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population (Prasad and Narayan 2004).
Exports into the European Union receive
prices that are from two to three times the
world market price.3 There is little doubt that
the preferences will fall over time, possibly
in a stepwise fashion. The first of these
reductions, of 50 per cent, is due to occur at
the end of 2007; the complete erosion of the
subsidy could happen within a decade. The
abolition of the preferential price arrange-
ment is imminent given European Unions’
commitment to abiding by the WTO process.
The lapse of the subsidy, unless prepared for
well in advance, will create serious pains of
adjustment that are likely to flow on to the
rest of the economy. The incentives for
Table 1 Sugar production statistics, 1971–2002
Year No. of contracts Area harvested Production Sugar production
(‘000 hectares) (‘000 tons) (‘000 tons)
1971 15,548 47 2,545 323
1972 15,612 44 2,238 303
1973 16,533 46 2,496 301
1974 16,546 45 2,151 272
1975 17,264 45 2,160 264
1976 17,667 47 2,283 286
1977 18,395 52 2,674 362
1978 18,456 54 2,853 347
1979 19,152 62 4,063 473
1980 19,700 66 3,360 396
1981 21,000 66 3,931 470
1982 21,574 69 4,075 487
1983 21,880 59 2,203 276
1984 22,130 69 4,290 480
1985 22,159 70 3,042 341
1986 22,182 69 4,109 502
1987 22,255 66 2,960 401
1988 22,127 64 3,185 363
1989 21,771 71 4,099 461
1990 21,334 70 4,016 408
1991 24,479 73 3,380 389
1992 23,334 73 3,533 426
1993 23,454 74 3,704 442
1994 23,264 74 4,064 517
1995 22,449 74 4,110 454
1996 22,304 74 4,380 454
1997 22,100 73 3,280 347
1998 22,146 57 2,098 266
1999 22,178 65 3,958 377
2000 22,179 63 3,786 341
2001 21,882 66 2,805 293
2002 21,246 65 3,423 330
Source: Fiji, 1990. Current Economic Statistics Bulletin, January, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva; Fiji, 2003.
Current Economic Statistics Bulletin, June, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva.
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managing the adjustment process are strong.
The Economic Partnership Arrangements of
the European Union, moreover, contain
measures to support adjustments to liberal
trade as per WTO commitments (European
Commission 2002).
The smallholder sector, which supplies
all of the sugarcane, comprises some 21,000
farmers with supply-contracts to the Fiji
Sugar Corporation (FSC). The average farm
size is 4.6 hectares producing around 160
tons of sugarcane (data from Kingi 2004). All
of the farms are rain fed and in a good year,
total sugarcane production is approximately
4 million tons. The sugarcane is manually
harvested by some 14,000 cutters who
operate in small gangs, with the cane being
transported to one of the four sugar mills
operated by the FSC. Approximately equal
quantities of cane are transported via the rail
system operated by the FSC and on privately
operated motor trucks (lorries); the latter
have been increasing as sugarcane
cultivation has expanded into areas without
rail transport (FSC 2002). The mills are 68
per cent owned by the government, and
employ around 3,000 workers—some only
during the half-yearly harvesting season.
Depending on milling efficiency and the
volume of throughput, total sugar production
has ranged from 264,000 (in 1975) to 517,000
tons (in 1994, see Table 1).4 Most of the sugar
produced is exported and some 80 per cent
of the exports are sold to the European Union
at a preferential price under the Sugar
Protocol. The price paid to the grower for the
cane is determined by a legislated formula
that apportions the average price received
for the sugar produced between the FSC and
the grower (see Reddy 2004).
Seventy-four per cent of the farms are
operated by Indo-Fijians with the vast
majority of the farms on leased land. Leases
have been expiring since 1997 with some
1,500 having expired in 2001 (see Table 2).
The majority of the farms with expired leases
have been taken over by the landowners,
although a few are in the process of having
their leases renewed. The area under
sugarcane cultivation has been falling. In an
attempt to stem this decline in sugarcane
production, the government has been
providing a grant of F$10,000 to each
landowner taking up sugarcane farming.
Table 2 Expiry of sugarcane farm leases in Fiji, 1997–2005
Year of expiry Indo-Fijian leases All cane leases
No. Area No. Area
(hectares) (hectares)
1997 27 232 27 232
1998 120 1,398 128 1,463
1999 158 1,708 170 1,962
2000 1,133 8,217 1,218 8,838
2001 1,494 7,861 1,542 8,337
2002 310 2,670 322 2,912
2003 435 2,945 465 3,240
2004 216 2,250 231 2,390
2005 228 2,297 245 2,490
Source: Reddy, M. and Naidu, V., 2001. ‘Land tenure system in Fiji: the poverty implication of expiring
leases’, Development Bulletin, 55:33–35.
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Many of the new landowner farmers have
high expectations of the returns from
sugarcane farming. Farmers enticed into the
industry with public handouts will likely
resist the withdrawal of subsidies when it
does eventuate, and thus could become a
strong lobby for domestic subsidies when the
externally funded price support is withdrawn.
Such subsidies would create their own set of
political interests and ensuing problems.
Incentives for land (and ethnic)
politics
Indigenous Fijians own some 87 per cent of
total land; the state holds another 6 per cent,
with the remainder being held under freehold
title (Prasad 2004). The NLTB, established
by the Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1940,
has the sole legislative mandate to administer
all land held in native title ‘for the benefit of
Fijian Owners.5 The Board of Trustees of
NLTB comprise the President, the Minister
for Fijian Affairs, and another 10 members of
whom at least 8 must be indigenous Fijians.
The NLTB makes general policies regarding
administration of native land, approval of
leases, collection and distribution of
proceeds from rental of land,6 and in building
landlord-tenant relations. The NLTB, from
its inception, has been remarkably successful
in facilitating access to under-utilised land.
Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, the architect of the
scheme, convinced landowners to release
land for farming for the benefit of the nation
as well as to farmers and the landowners.
He argued to the 1936 Council of Chiefs that
‘it is our duty to use our influence, our power,
to open up waste mataqali land for
agricultural purposes; whether they be taken
up by Europeans, Indians, or Fijians’ (quoted
in Ward 1995:243). The scheme delivered
gains from exchange and was based on trust
between the lessees and lessors and,
importantly, amongst the lessors themselves.7
The NLTB has a monopoly, granted via
legislation, over the issue and administration
of leases. This position has lent itself to abuse
over time. Ward (1995:247), for example,
suggested that the NLTB effectively
dispossesses the owners of their land, while
Vesikula (2002) noted that the distribution
of rental income is a cause of considerable
conflict within the landowning clan.
The incentives for rent-seeking
behaviour by the NLTB intensified over time
as the preferential price accorded to sugar
increased while an increasing population,
in a subdued economic environment, raised
the pressure on land. Political competition
intensified following independence in 1970,
and thus land ownership offered itself as a
convenient mechanism for mobilisation of the
indigenous electorate (Prasad 2004). Similar
incentives for mobilisation of ethnic Indian
voters were generated as a defensive
response. The trust of landowners in the
NLTB also eroded over time as the institution
itself became increasingly politicised.
Informal (vakavanua) arrangements emerged
as the administrative burden and distrust of
the NLTB grew, but such arrangements have
been unpopular for long-term crops such as
sugarcane. The lack of legislative legitimacy
has made enforceability of vakavanua contracts
a problem. However, the vakavanua arrange-
ments have been popular, particularly in the
Sigatoka valley, for short-term (seasonal)
cash crops such as maize, rice and tobacco.
The sugar industry is highly regulated,
encompassing institutionalised (often
legislated) groupings of landowners, growers ,
the miller, and the government. The Sugar
Industry Act of 1984 created the Sugar
Commission of Fiji (charged with the
responsibility for coordination between
sections of the industry), the Sugar Industry
Tribunal (to settle industrial disputes), the
Sugar Cane Growers’ Council (as the
representative of the growers), and Mill Area
Committees (to organise harvesting) (see FSC
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2002). The Fiji Sugar Corporation, the trade
unions, the Fiji Sugar Marketing Company,
and the Sugar Cane Research Station add
yet other layers of organisational complexity.
The apportionment of proceeds from sale of
sugar between the miller and the growers is
also governed by legislation in the form of a
Master Award (Reddy 2004).
The electoral system, moreover, provides
strong incentives for ethnic competition. Each
of the three post-independence constitutions
allocates the majority of the seats in the
National Parliament (that is, the House of
Representatives) on communal lines; the
1997 Constitution, for example, in the 71
member parliament has 23 and 19 seats,
respectively, reserved for indigenous Fijians
and ethnic Indians. One seat is reserved for
Rotumans (that is, inhabitants of the island
of Rotuma or registered as such) and another
three are reserved for people not belonging
to the communal groupings identified above.
The landowner–tenant divide thus serves as
a convenient instrument for mobilisation of
voters for political support at national
elections.
The smallholder sector that produces
sugarcane can be characterised as a perfectly
competitive industry. It has minimal barriers
to entry and exit. Population growth without
job opportunities in the rest of the economy
over the past three decades has led to the
smallholder sector being the holding sector
for the underemployed. Except at the peak of
harvesting, supply of unskilled labour has
not been a problem. The competitive nature
of the smallholder sector implies that all rents
to the growers are dissipated. First, the rent
component of income from profitable farms
such as those on alluvial plains close to the
mills is capitalised; second, rising prices for
sugarcane have led to an expansion of the
area under cultivation (see Figure 1)—mainly
onto marginal land and/or onto land further
Figure 1 Expansion in area of sugarcane cultivation and price of cane, 1971–2002
Source: Fiji, 2003. Current Economic Statistics, June, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva; Fiji, 1990. Current
Economic Statistics, January, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva.
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away from the mills so that rents have been
lost to rising costs of production and/or
transportation; and third, subsidies have
induced inefficiencies both in farming and
milling. The simple correlation between the
(current) price of cane and the area under
cultivation over the 1971 to 1997 period (that
is, before the lease renewals became a
problem) is equal to 0.78.
Several surveys confirm that the majority
of the farms make poor returns, with many
continually in debt (Rao 2003). Milling
inefficiency, represented by the ratio of tons
of cane used to produce a ton of sugar, has
also increased with the price of sugar (see
Figure 2).8 The elasticity of tons of cane used
to produce a ton of sugar with respect to the
price for sugar for the 1971 to 2002 period is
0.1. This estimate is robust to the inclusion
of area under cultivation to include the
potential drop in cane quality with
expansion of area under cultivation (see
Appendix Tables A1 to A3).9 The dissipation
of subsidies in these ways is not peculiar to
the Fiji sugar industry but is a common
phenomenon across industries and countries
(see Horstman and Markusen 1986; Vousden
1993; Chand 1999).
If rent dissipation is indeed the case, then
the withdrawal of the subsidy to sugar
should see a shrinkage in area under
sugarcane production—possibly to those
areas close to the mills and onto alluvial
plains suitable for mechanised cultivation
and harvesting, but without a significant
loss of income to those growers over the
longer-term. The short-term pains from such
a shock are likely to be large and
disproportionately felt by farmers on
marginal land and land distant from the
mills.
Landowners have been led to believe that
the returns they have received are an unfairly
low share of the rents from sugarcane
Figure 2 Milling efficiency and sugar price, 1971–2002
Source: Fiji, 1990. Current Economic Statistics, January, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva; Fiji, 2003. Current
Economic Statistics, June, Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Suva.
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farming. Kurer (2001:1) notes that ‘[t]here is
hardly a more universal complaint among
Fijian landowners that they receive unfairly
low rents from their land’. Such a perception
has been common in village discussions,
particularly around the kava bowl. It was
given legitimacy via Davies and Gallimore
(1999) when this study was publicised
widely in the popular press. The conclusion
that if ‘just and fair’ rents had been paid over
the previous 30 years, each Fijian household
would have received an additional
accumulated total of approximately F$15,000
was particularly noted. The ‘exploitation’ of
landowners gained currency in the lead-up
to the coup of 2000 when some indigenous
Fijian political leadership pursued it.
Kurer (2001) in his detailed study
confirms the competitive nature of the
industry. He shows that the average farmer
earns an annual cash income, inclusive of
the costs of labour, of F$862; this is in sharp
contrast to the estimate of F$8,000 by Davies
and Gallimore (1999).10 Many commentators
have repeatedly pointed out the low
productivity of the sector, the prevalence of
inefficient farming practices, and the
unrealistic expectations landowners have of
rewards from sugarcane farming (see Forsyth
1995; Kurer 2001; Rao 2003). Why then have
indigenous leaders pursued the view of high
returns from sugarcane farming? There are
strong political incentives for such
misinformation. Sugarcane farming and land
serve as convenient instrument for mobilising
the electorate on ethnicity. Together, they form
the basis for ethnic politics; a process
reinforced by the electoral system where the
majority of the parliamentary seats are
allocated on ethnic lines.
The NLTB presents the landowners as a
united front, thus providing a strong
incentive for tenants to unite in an
adversarial environment. The process of
lease renewals, moreover, is an outcome of
political bargain between parties
representing the two major ethnic groups in
the national parliament. The Agricultural
Landlord and Tenants Act of 1976 (ALTA),
for example, defined the term of lease
renewals (of 30 years), the rights of tenants
and landowners, and a rental formula
together with dispute settling mechanism.11
The Growers’ Union, thus, earns its
legitimacy only as a defender of the interests
of the tenants, the majority of whom are
ethnic Indians. This can be thought of as a
capitalist (landowner) and labour (tenant)
divide, but reinforced by an electoral system
that allocates seats in parliament on the basis
of ethnicity. In this context, aspiring leaders
have an incentive to play up the landowner-
tenant divide to maximise their support in
national elections. Not surprisingly, land
issues with divisive politics surface regularly
during political strife. The system of
incentives explains the prevalence of
ethnically based politics, which is in essence
a landowner-tenant struggle: a struggle given
impetus via subsidies through the sugar
protocol of the European Union. The above
describes the deep causes of ethnically based
competition in Fiji. Rents have been
dissipated in ‘wars of attrition’ between the
two ethnic groups, leading to an outcome
akin to that of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.
The analytical framework
For tractability, assume that the NLTB has
sole authority to make land available for
sugarcane farming. Furthermore, let the
Growers’ Union be the sole representative of
the smallholder sugarcane-growing sector.
Rents are provided through subsidies to
sugarcane production. We now have two
players competing over the subsidy. Let the
date of expiry of land leases be an
endogenous outcome of political competition.
The structure of incentives is one leading to
reinforcing cleavage formation. The above
characterises a non-cooperative two-player
FACILITATING ADJUSTMENT TO THE SUGAR WOES IN FIJI
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(Nash) game between the two ethnic groups.
This game is depicted in the payoff matrix
given in Table 3.
The payoffs are hypothetical and only
indicative of the relative magnitudes. The two
players are the Growers’ Union and the
NLTB, with the payoffs to each given in
parenthesis. As an example, if the two players
choose to cooperate by equally sharing the
rents, then each gets a payoff of 3 as shown
in the third row of column 3. If, on the other
hand, the growers choose to cooperate while
the NLTB decides to compete (say by
extracting goodwill from the growers), then
all rents (net of dissipation of 2 units, in terms
of resources spent to collect the goodwill)
accrues to the latter. The payoff in the bottom
left cell is for the converse case, while the
payoffs are nil for each when both compete,
as all rents are lost to dissipation. Note that
in this game the joint payoff of 6 (that is, 3+3)
is maximised when both players cooperate
while non-cooperation leads to the worst
possible outcome.
The Nash outcome, given by the bottom
far right-hand cell with a nil payoff to both
players, is discussed next.
A rent-seeking monopoly has the
incentive to claim the presence of rents to
justify its own existence. The monopoly,
however, has the incentive to retain all rents
given the competitive nature of its
franchisees. The political leadership that
draws support from an ethnically based
electorate has an incentive in maintaining
the monopoly. One would therefore expect
the NLTB to be highly politicised,
legitimising its existence in a competitive
framework as an agency for extracting rents
from the competing party. The above
presupposes the existence of rents to begin
with but the NLTB has an incentive to
exaggerate the existence of high profits
earned by the ethnic-Indian farmers. The
above explains why a study such as Davies
and Gallimore (1999), supporting the
presence of rents, would be popular amongst
the indigenous (landowner) leadership
while those challenging such a view, as did
Kurer (2001), would largely be ignored.
The Growers’ Union, as the represent-
ative of the tenants, has the incentive to
convince tenants that lease-renewal can be
achieved via the political process. That is,
the Union loses its legitimacy should lease-
renewals become independent of the political
process. The Growers’ Union is funded via
levies (in contrast to the NLTB), and thus its
existence depends on continuing political
support. Such support, moreover, is critical
for communal-parliamentary seats from the
sugarcane growing districts; the
politicisation of the industry on the part of
the ethnic Indians is thus least surprising.
The game theoretic framework used
above makes a number of simplifying
Table 3 Pay-off matrix for tenant–owner game
NLTB
(on behalf of landowners)
Cooperate Compete
Growers’ Union
(on behalf of tenants) Cooperate (3, 3) (0, 4)
Compete (4, 0) (0, 0)
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assumptions. This highly stylised
representation of the land and sugar issues
in Fiji, however, generates a number of
predictions that are consistent with reality.
The analysis, for example, provides the basis
for the ethnically based and highly divisive
politics in the country. Of note is the fact that
changing the electoral rules to induce cross-
cutting cleavages, as was attempted under
the 1997 Constitution, was unsuccessful in
ameliorating the ethnically divisive politics;
possibly because it failed to address the deep
roots of such competition.12 In many respects,
the competition between the landowners
(capitalists) and tenants (labour) in Fiji is not
too dissimilar to that seen elsewhere. The
game theoretic framework used above,
importantly, enables us to suggest remedies
both in terms of improving access to land
and in facilitating adjustment to the loss of
subsidies. One clear implication is that sugar-
subsidies have encouraged rent-seeking
behaviour, and thus the erosion of trade
preferences will reduce such socially
harmful competition.
Facilitating adjustment to erosion
of sugar subsidies from the
European Union
Each smallholder producing sugarcane has
a supply contract with the FSC in the form of
a Farm Basic Allotment (FBA); as of 2002, the
aggregate FBA stood at 4.08 million tons of
sugarcane. As the first step in preparation
for restructure of the sugar industry, the FBA
could be assigned a property right. The value
of the FBA can be deduced under the
assumption that the preferences will fall in
two equal steps; first at the end of 2007, and
the remainder by the end of 2014. Under this
assumption, we can calculate the value of
subsidy implicit in each ton of sugar. Imagine
a situation where the subsidy implicit in
sugar exports is paid as a lump sum from
the European Union. The funds could then
be used to purchase the FBA of individual
farmers, thus creating a market for the asset
created via the trade preference.
Let’s use an illustrative case to
demonstrate how such a market would work
in practice. Assume that under current levels
of subsidy, sugarcane is priced at F$50 per
ton. The assumptions regarding stepwise
erosion of subsidies implies that this price
will fall to F$35 per ton from 2008, and
decline to the subsidy-free price of F$20 per
ton by the beginning of 2015. Assuming a
discount rate of 5 per cent, the net present
value of subsidies implicit in each ton of FBA
for the life of the Sugar Protocol is F$156.67.
Thus, on the basis of these assumptions, each
ton of FBA as of the beginning of 2005 is
worth F$156.67. Of this, F$9.40 would accrue
to landowners as their share of the proceeds
on the assumption that land rents amount to
6 per cent of the capitalised value of the
subsidies.
A voluntary restructure of the industry
could be induced via the purchase of the
FBAs from smallholders funded by a lump-
sum transfer of the subsidy (decoupled from
sugar production) from the European Union.
Farmers would have the following options:
selling their FBA and exiting the industry;
selling their FBA but remaining in the
industry and selling their cane at the
subsidy-free price; or remaining in the
industry and enjoying the preferential price
until it expires. These decisions could be left
to the individual farmer, but they would be
provided with the information on future
sugar prices and the rationale for the
purchase of the FBAs.
We can calculate the financial incentives
facing farmers for each of the options listed
above. Using the cash flow calculations
provided in Kurer (2001: Table 4), an average
farmer producing 160 tons of sugarcane
would have the option of cashing their FBA
for F$23,564 (that is, 160 tons multiplied by
FACILITATING ADJUSTMENT TO THE SUGAR WOES IN FIJI
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F$147.27 per ton), followed by the option of
remaining in the industry and facing the
subsidy-free price of F$20 per ton, or exiting
the industry altogether. 13 If this farmer
invests this lump sum with the Fiji National
Provident Fund, their cash income at an
annual return of 7 per cent would amount to
F$1,649; should they decide to invest the
amount in 15-year government bonds, the
return at 5 per cent would amount to an
annual income of F$1,178; and, a fixed
deposit with the commercial banks with a
return of 3 per cent would yield an annual
income of F$707. The annual income from
investing the sugar-rents in these ways range
from 191 per cent to 82 per cent of the annual
cash income of F$862 earned by the farmer
as reported in Kurer (2001).14 The financial
incentives facing the farmer clearly favour
selling the FBA and as soon as practical; the
latter given the fact that the value of the FBA
diminishes over time. The landowner,
moreover, will continue to be paid land-
rents; this will now be based on the revised
UCV that, in turn, will depend on the quality
of the land and how efficiently it is used.
Demands for improved efficiency in land use
will induce rationalisation within the
smallholder sector. The revised UCV,
however, will at least equal the old UCV less
the capitalised value of rents; thus,
landowners are unlikely to lose financially
from the sale of the FBA.
Now to address some of the potential
difficulties associated with the above
strategy. First, will this mean the decimation
of the sugar industry? Probably not, as the
farms on the alluvial plains close to the mills
will still find it profitable to grow sugarcane
at the subsidy-free price. Even if it does mean
a substantial reduction in the size of the
industry, as in a worst-case scenario, this
should not be of concern since the income
earned from the land can remain healthy (that
is, ‘sweet’) without relying on sugar. Next,
will the European Union pay the aid implicit
in the sugar protocol as a lump sum? This is
an issue for negotiation between the
authorities, but such a request would be
consistent with the WTO agenda and the EU
Economic Partnership Agreements that
encourage assistance with adjustment. If the
European Union is willing to provide aid via
trade, then it is hard to argue against
continuing with the transfer as a one-off,
lump sum payment to facilitate adjustment.
If the European Union is unwilling to oblige,
a request for assistance could be made to the
international agencies.
How about the workers in the industry
who will be made redundant? Given that the
rents from preferential access to the European
Union are divided between the manufacturer
and the grower according to a set formula, a
similar scheme to that for the grower can be
devised for workers made redundant as the
industry is forced to rationalise. What would
be the political ramifications of paying out
large sums of money to a select group of
farmers? This could be tricky, but there is
precedence in the government providing
taxpayer-funded grants to farmers exiting the
industry as well as landowners commencing
sugarcane farming.15 The challenge for the
leaders, and policymakers, would be to
explain the logic for such a transfer as it is
akin to making a fully-funded redundancy
payout to farmers opting out of subsidised
production for good.
Improving access to communally
owned land
An efficiently operating market allowing
access to land on the basis of a transparent
and enforceable system of rules is critical for
investment and growth in the broader
economy (see de Soto 2000 and World Bank
2003). The market for land requires
regulation. This is so for three reasons: first,
due to the high costs and large economies of
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scale of the institutional infrastructure
needed to establish and maintain land rights;
second, to allow for common standards and
maintenance of records to enable impersonal
exchange of land rights; and third, to
minimise costs of enforcement of property
rights (see World Bank 2003). An efficiently
operating market facilitating access to land
induces (long-term) investment, whereas a
failing market can be a barrier to growth of
the entire economic system. The costs of land
conflicts, moreover, are disproportionately
borne by the poor (World Bank 2003:xv) and
have the potential to escalate into civil wars
as demonstrated by the recent experience of
Solomon Islands. Such ‘externalities’ justify
public sector participation in securing
property rights to land. We draw on the long-
established systems for financial inter-
mediation to think about facilitating secure,
possibly long-term, access to communally
owned land. It may be instructive to think of
land as a fixed deposit, but with one major
difference—land has spatial identity.
Accepting the need for a regulator to
facilitate access to communally owned land,
we consider how the existing system could be
reformed. One sensible path to follow would
be to unbundle the relevant components of
NLTB into a Land Regulatory Authority
(LRA) and a component responsible for
intermediation of land between landowners
and tenants. The component responsible for
intermediation could be outsourced to the
competitive private sector. The regulator
would serve an analogous function to a
Central Bank regarding supervision of the
private sector intermediaries and in providing
the regulatory framework for the efficient
operation of the land-access market. More
specifically, the role of the regulator would
be in formulating rules regarding the
operation of the market that facilitates access
to land. The regulator would have to operate
strictly at arm’s length from lessees and
lessors. Regulation would include the facility
to register land by any individual or group
of individuals and in making available the
use of such an asset for any length of time.16
Traditional landowners, for example,
could be allowed to register their land either
individually or jointly (via the i-tokatoka or
mataqali ).17 The existing parts of NLTB
currently providing land-intermediation
services could be broken up, possibly by
provinces, and handed over to the provincial
authorities. Land, much like fixed deposits,
could then be made available for use for any
period of time, subject to the prevailing
regulations. The intermediary with
appropriate regulatory supervision would
have to guarantee that the leased land would
revert back to the owner on the expiry of the
lease. Payments for using the land would be
a matter to be determined between the
landowner and the tenant. Contracts would
have to be drawn up, within the broad
guidelines set by the regulator, and registered
with the LRA such that a central repository
of information on property rights is created
and maintained. This should lead to the
development of a secondary market for the
lease. The payoff matrix between the tenant
and the landowner would now look very
different. Both will now be induced to
cooperate in using any under-utilised
resource for mutual gain. The intermediation
services, moreover, are similar to that
provided by real estate agents in respect of
rental accommodation for housing within the
major urban centres.
A system of the kind proposed above has
several advantages over the existing system.
First, it devolves decision-making on access
to communally owned land to the individual
owners and investors, but within a regulated
system. Second, it permits leases of whatever
length to be traded on the market with a price
determined via forces of supply and demand.
Third, it brings in competition over land-
intermediation, thus encouraging mutually
beneficial exchange between landowners
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and investors, as opposed to the prisoner’s
dilemma outcome (Table 3). As an example,
a landowner may act strategically in giving
secure long-term access to a small parcel of
their land in order to raise the value of the
surrounding land. Such a scheme has been
used relatively successfully in availing land
for a major tourist development on Denerau
Island. The system proposed above,
moreover, will also erode incentives for
ethnically based politics in Fiji.
Conclusions
The expiry of land leases on which sugar cane
has been grown has brought to a head the
challenges of facilitating secure long-term
access to land. Doing so is particularly critical
as a healthy market for secure and long-term
access to land has implications for investment
and growth of production in the broader
economy. The impending erosion of
preferences to sugar exports to the European
Union as world trade is liberalised has
increased the urgency for deciding on policies
relating to adjustments to such a large shock.
Much of the popular discussion has tried to
address the issues regarding facilitating long-
term access to land in the same breath as
meeting the adjustment challenges posed by
the erosion of sugar subsidies. This paper
argues that these two, albeit related, are
separate issues deserving their own distinct
solutions. The issue of facilitating long-term
secure access to land is a long-term challenge;
the resolution of which necessitates building
on the success of the existing mechanisms,
the Native Land Trust Board arrangements
in particular. The issue of facilitating
adjustment to the erosion of preferential access
to sugar exports to the European Union is a
short-term challenge and one that is likely to
be painful due to forced rationalisation; but
one way or another this problem will be
resolved in the next 14 years or so.
By subsidising resettlement of
landowners on sugarcane farms vacated by
tenants on the expiry of leases, policymakers
have encouraged entry into a declining
industry. This will exacerbate the pains of
adjustment as EU subsidies delivered
through the payment of preferential prices
for Fijian sugar exports are withdrawn. There
is the distinct possibility that the newly
settled growers will undergo an unnecessary
round of adjustment pains as the price of
sugarcane falls. The prospective erosion of
subsidies paid for sugar sold to the European
Union is already placing severe demands on
efficiency and productivity, both in growing
the sugarcane and in milling the crop.
Placing these demands on new growers is
only likely to lead to even greater distress.18
This paper suggests interventions to
facilitate long-term and secure access to
communally owned land and argues for the
creation of a regulatory agency charged with
the responsibility of providing arms-length
supervision of a market driven process that
allows landowners to make their land
available to investors. The model followed
here is akin to that of financial intermediation
where banks take fixed deposits, which are
on-lent to investors for use on agreed terms
and prices and under conditions of certainty.
Such a system is likely to induce cooperation
between the owners of land and those with
the capital to make the most productive use
of the asset. Private sector intermediaries
make the market while the regulator ensures
prudential supervision to avoid problems in
the market spilling over to the rest of the
economy. Achieving the above reforms is a
long-term challenge and one likely to impact
on the rate of investment and growth of the
economy.
Facilitating adjustment to the loss of
preferential access into the European Union,
in contrast, is a short-term challenge. The
Fijian economy would have to adjust,
possibly very painfully, if nothing was done
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to ease such pains as the preferential price is
reduced. The solution proposed here is
relatively clean in terms of economic
efficiency, though the political acceptance of
such a solution is hard to gauge. We propose
that the aid implicit in sugar subsidies from
the European Union be ‘decoupled from
production’ and provided as a lump sum.
This amount could then be used to purchase
the sugarcane supply contracts (that is, the
farm-based allotments) from the smallholder
sector. Using an illustrative example, we
show that farmers, in all likelihood, will
happily sell their farm-based allotments on
purely financially considerations. A similar
mechanism could be used to rationalise the
milling sector by paying-off workers made
redundant from the rationalisation of the
industry. This proposal facilitates rapid
adjustment, participation of the stakeholders
is totally voluntary, and the proposal is fully
funded and consistent with WTO rules. This
proposal has applicability beyond Fiji,
particularly for adjustment in industries
supported by preferential access into foreign
country markets.
Notes
1 This was the Punta del Este Declaration of
ministers of trade made in September 1986
(quoted from http://www.acpsugar.org/
eusugar1995review.htm, accessed on 18
October 2004).
2 These are registered as DS265, DS266, and
DS286, respectively. The WTO is reported to
have ruled against the subsidies and the
European Union has announced its intentions
to appeal this decision (reported by Economic
News, http://economy.news.designerz.com/
wto-rules-against-eu-sugar-subsidies-bloc-to-
appeal.html accessed on 18 November 2004).
3 As of 2004, the price paid for ACP exports of
sugar to the European Union was 600 euros
per ton, while the world market price was
250 euros. The total value of transfers via the
subsidy, assuming that the EU-agreed quota
of 165,348 and the 19,181 tons sold under the
Special Preferential Sugar (with the latter sold
at a price that is 85 per cent of the guaranteed
quota price under the former) quota is
satisfied, will amount to nearly 64 million
euros.
4 By international standards, Fiji is a high cost
producer. Cane output in Fiji of around 50
tons per hectare compares unfavourably
with that for Mauritius of 80 tons per hectare.
The Fiji Prime Minister, moreover, has stated
that cane yield per hector in Fiji is the second
lowest and sugar yield the worst amongst
the 20 ACP sugar-producing states (Fiji Sun,
6 October 2004). The costs of producing a ton
of sugar at the four mills, according to the
Prime Minister, in Fiji dollars are 340, 320,
230, and 160 at the Penang, Lautoka, Labasa,
and Rarawai mills, respectively.
5 Information on the NLTB, including the
quote, is sourced from http://
www.nltb.com.fj/history.html, accessed on
17/09/2004.
6 Land rents are set at a maximum of 6 per
cent of unimproved capital value; the NLTB
retains 25 per cent of the rental proceeds to
cover administrative costs, the holder(s) of
the three upper-most chiefly title within the
traditional hierarchy take another 22.5 per
cent, leaving the remaining 52.5 per cent to
be shared by the rest of the mataqali (Ward
1995:221).
7 Such cooperation was possible under a
statesman like Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna and
perhaps assisted via a strong colonial regime
that under-wrote all formal contracts. Ratu
Sir Lala Sukuna had no illusions about the
challenges facing land intermediation,
pointing out to the chiefs in his address to
the Council of Chiefs in 1933 that: ‘We regard
the Indian desire for more permanent
tenancy as a natural and legitimate
consequence of an agricultural community
settling in any country. But how was this
desire to be reconciled with the need to
protect the interests of present and future
Fijian landowners?’ (as quoted in NLTB 2004).
8 Part of the rise in the total cane to sugar ratio
(TCTS) is attributed to planting of varieties
such as Mana that have low pure obtainable
cane sugar and to increased burning of cane
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during harvest; these in turn are due to cane
being grown on marginal land with weeds
being a major problem. Burning of cane
increases at the end of the season when
farmers rush to clear the standing crop from
the fields.
9 The estimate here is of a long-run elasticity;
the short time series disallows use of an error
correction form (ECM) to decipher short and
long run elasticities. The diagnostics do not
suggest serious problems with the preferred
model, however.
10 Davies and Gallimore reach this figure by
multiplying the average price of cane of F$50
by the average farm production of 160 tons,
ignoring the costs of all inputs (including land
rents, harvest and transportation costs, etc).
11 ALTA superseded the Agricultural Landlord
and Tenant Ordinance (ALTO) of 1966 that
legislated 10-year leases.
12 The 1997 Constitution can be seen as an
attempt at imbedding the above game within
a super-game with payoffs to force the
cooperative outcome; with the benefit of
hindsight of the 1999 elections, this proved
not to be the case.
13 These payments would accrue to farms with
leases up to 2014; leases expiring earlier than
2014 would have the payments to the
stakeholders mimic what happens implicitly
under the current system.
14 Kurer (2001) in arriving at this figure does
not include transportation costs and costs
attributed to supply of domestic labour; land
rents and debt servicing are factored in his
calculations, however.
15 The People’s Coalition Government
provided F$28,000 rehabilitation grants to
displaced farmers, while the SDL
Government has been providing F$10,000
grants to landowners entering the industry.
16 The UCV is maximised with a perpetual lease.
That is, the UCV for a piece of land that
generates rent (super-normal profit) of one
unit each year equals 1/r[1-e-rT], where r and
T are the discount rate and the length of the
lease, respectively.
17 The hierarchy of the indigenous social
groupings has as its apex the vanua with the
following breakdown as one progresses
down the pyramid: yavusa; mataqali; and,
tokatoka. This characterisation was made
uniform via the colonial authorities in
preparation for land registrations in 1896 (see
Ward, 1995: 202).
18 The Fiji Sun of 4 September 2004:21 in an
article titled ‘Lega ni taukei e na tei dovu’
(Trouble for landowners growing sugarcane)
notes that displaced sugarcane farmers settled
on government land in Navua were earning
good cash income from traditional crops,
while landowners in sugarcane farming were
facing trouble.
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Appendix
Table A1 Basic statistics on variables modelled; sample period, 1971–2002
Variable(s) Sugar price Cane price Area TCTS
(current F$) (current F$) (‘000 hectares)  (ratio)
Maximum 1031.0 81.79 74.00 11.10
Minimum 97.00 7.95 44.00 7.38
Mean 460.78 37.74 62.78 8.65
Coefficient of variation (per cent) 48.00 44.00 16.00 11.00
Table A2 Correlation matrix of variables
Sugar price Cane price Area TCTS
Sugar price 1.000
Cane price 0.85985 1.000
Area 0.5234 0.6291 1.000
TCTS 0.58234 0.55984 0.42913 1.000
Table A3 Model estimates for milling efficiency to sugar price (dependent variable: log
TCTS)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.54** 1.47** 1.27** 2.09**
(9.41) (9.22) (3.33) (4.03)
Log(sugar price) 0.10** 0.083**
(3.75) (2.28)
Log (sugar pricet-1) 0.11** 0.19
(4.31) (0.31)
Log (area) 0.092 –0.34
(0.78) (–0.73)
Time trend No No No Yes
Number of observations 32 31 32 31
Adj. R-squared 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.40
DW-statistic 1.68 1.51 1.56 1.78
Notes: t-ratios are given in parenthesis; ** denotes the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at 5 per
cent level of significance; and the TCTS is tons of cane to ton of sugar. Given the small number of
observations, care has to be taken in interpreting the results above. The errors generated from each of the
models were diagnosed for problems of misspecification, autocorrelation, joint-significance of parameter
estimates, etc. The plot of error terms from Model 1, the preferred model, is give below.
